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Abstract Depression has been associated with increased re-
sponse times at the incongruent-, neutral-, and negative-word
trials of the classical and emotional Stroop tasks (Epp et al.,
Clinical Psychology Review, 32, 316–328, 2012). Response-
time slowdown effects at incongruent- and negative-word tri-
als of the Stroop tasks were reported to correlate with depres-
sive severity, indicating strong relevance of the effects to the
symptomatology. This study proposes a novel integrative
computational model of neural mechanisms of both the clas-
sical and emotional Stroop effects, drawing on the previous
prominent theoretical explanations of performance at the clas-
sical Stroop task (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland,
Psychological Review, 97, 332–361, 1990; Herd, Banich, &
O’Reilly, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 22–32,
2006), and in addition suggesting that negative emotional
words represent conditioned stimuli for future negative out-
comes. The model is shown to explain the classical Stroop
effect and the slow (between-trial) emotional Stroop effect
with biologically plausible mechanisms, providing an advan-
tage over the previous theoretical accounts (Matthews &
Harley, Cognition & Emotion, 10, 561–600, 1996; Wyble,
Sharma, & Bowman, Cognition & Emotion, 22, 1019–1051,
2008). Simulation results suggested a candidate mechanism
responsible for the pattern of depressive performance at the
classical and the emotional Stroop tasks. Hyperactivity of the
amygdala, together with increased inhibitory influence of the
amygdala over dopaminergic neurotransmission, could be at
the origin of the performance deficits.
Keywords Depression . Amygdala . Computational model .
Emotion . Dopamine . Neural network
Introduction and background
Classical and emotional Stroop tasks are experimental para-
digms which probe cognitive control in the face of conflicting
information and emotional distraction, respectively.
Depression is associated with performance deficits at both
tasks (Epp et al., 2012). In this study, we first set out to inves-
tigate the neural mechanisms underpinning the classical and
emotional Stroop effects, from a theoretical perspective. We
then proceed to suggest deficits in these mechanisms which
might be characteristic of depression.
Classical Stroop effect and neural mechanisms
The classical Stroop task requires participants to name the ink
colour of a word, where the verbal meaning of the word itself
is either colour-congruent (e.g. Red printed in red ink), incon-
gruent (e.g. Green printed in red ink), or not relevant to the
response (neutral; e.g. Glass printed in red ink). The hallmark
Stroop effect manifests itself as the delay in response when
colour-naming incongruent combinations, compared to neu-
tral combinations. Quickest responses are observed to congru-
ent stimuli. Slower responses in the incongruent condition
indicate an added cognitive load. As a result, the task has been
used for investigating mechanisms of cognitive control
(Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; MacLeod, 1991).
From a mechanistic perspective, arguably the most influ-
ential model of the classical Stroop effect has been proposed
* Peggy Seriès
pseries@inf.ed.ac.uk
1 Institute for Adaptive and Neural Computation, School of
Informatics, University of Edinburgh, 10 Crichton Street,
Edinburgh EH8 9AB, UK
2 School of Medicine (Neuroscience), University of Dundee,
Ninewells Hospital and Medical School, Dundee DD1 9SY, UK
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci
DOI 10.3758/s13415-016-0478-4
by Cohen et al. (1990) within the connectionist parallel dis-
tributed processing (PDP) framework. The model posits two
parallel competing neural pathways in the brain—one
dedicated to processing colour and another to processing
words. Because word-reading behaviour is more frequent-
ly practiced than colour naming, the word-reading path-
way is theorized as being overtrained compared to the
colour-naming pathway. When the network performs the
colour-naming task, the word-reading pathway provides
strong competition due to its automatic habitual nature.
To overcome this competition, the model proposes task-
specific facilitation nodes, corresponding to neural repre-
sentations of executive control. During colour naming, the
active colour-naming executive task set facilitates the
colour-naming processing pathway, which is then able to
overcome the word-reading pathway competition and ac-
tivate correct responses. The executive facilitation, how-
ever, is not strong enough to compensate completely for
the overtraining effects within the word-reading pathway.
This results in slower, although correct, performance at
colour naming, compared to word reading (with the stron-
gest effect at the incongruent trials)—as has been reported
experimentally. The Cohen et al. (1990) model accounts
successfully for the classical Stroop effect.
A notable extension of the PDP Stroop model has
been proposed in Herd, Banich, and O’Reilly (2006),
termed the top-down excitatory bias (TEB) model of
the Stroop effect. The original account by Cohen et al.
(1990) suggested long-range inhibitory connections be-
tween the executive and the processing areas. These
connections, however, appeared biologically implausible.
Banich et al. (2000) and Banich et al. (2001) have also
revealed some rather counterintuitive neuroimaging re-
sults related to the classical Stroop task. Specifically,
BOLD activations in verbal processing areas appeared
higher in incongruent trials compared to neutral trials.
The original PDP model could not account for these
findings. Herd et al. (2006) have improved the model
to exclude long-range inhibitory connections and include
representations of categories (alongside task units), re-
sponsible for facilitation of colour-related information in
all processing pathways. With the new colour category
representation, the model could account for the pattern
of verbal area activations reported in Banich et al.
(2000, 2001).
Common neurobiological interpretations of the PDP and
TEB models posit that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC) is responsible for maintaining representations of
the task set. This is supported by the experimental results
(Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007). Parietal-cortical verbal and
colour processing areas are proposed to correspond to the
colour and word processing pathways in the models (Cohen
et al., 1996; Herd et al., 2006).
Emotional Stroop effect and neural mechanisms
The emotional Stroop task, in contrast to the classical Stroop
task, uses affective (positive, negative, or neutral) rather than
colour words, with the similar task for the participants to name
the colour of the ink. The main finding is that negative words,
compared to positive and neutral words, cause interference
with task performance, measured with increased response
times (e.g. Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004; Frings, Englert,
Wentura, & Bermeitinger, 2010; McKenna & Sharma, 2004;
see review in Phaf & Kan, 2007). An important difference
between the two tasks should be noted: whereas ink colour
and word meaning are designed to induce response conflict in
the classical task, no conflict is present in the emotional task.
Instead, the response delay is considered to arise because of
the emotional relevance of the words. Whereas the classical
Stroop effect appears to be strongly manifested immediately
(i.e. in the trials with ink-incongruent colour words;MacLeod,
1991), the emotional Stroop effect appears to be expressed
more in a carry-over fashion (i.e. in the trials immediately
following those with negative words; e.g. Algom et al.,
2004; McKenna & Sharma, 2004). A meta-analysis has
shown that the effect is much more pronounced when nega-
tive-word trials are presented in blocks rather than intermixed
with neutral words (Phaf & Kan, 2007). This suggests that
negative words induce a between-trial slowdown. The task
has been useful for investigating the neural basis of control
over emotional interference (e.g. Compton et al., 2003), as
well as disturbances in anxiety and depression (e.g. Gotlib &
McCann, 1984; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996;
Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008).
Compared to the classical Stroop effect, relatively few
studies have looked at the neural basis of the emotional
Stroop effect. Crucially, activation of the amygdala has been
reported in generation of the effect (Isenberg et al., 1999).
Lack of behavioural slowdowns at negative-word trials, on
the other hand, was accompanied by activation of the
DLPFC, and deactivation of the amygdala (Compton et al.,
2003). Activated amygdala has also been highlighted at other
tasks during emotional word processing (Hamann & Mao,
2002; Naccache et al., 2005; Straube, Sauer, & Miltner,
2011), and during emotional distraction at executive and at-
tention tasks (see review in Iordan, Dolcos, & Dolcos, 2013).
In the latter case, amygdala appeared activated together with
ventral prefrontal cortex, and accompanied by deactivation of
the executive control areas, including the DLFPC. Apart from
the amygdala, several studies reported activations of the ros-
tral anterior cingluate cortex (rACC; Mohanty et al., 2007;
Whalen et al., 1998).
Compared to the classical Stroop task, only a single com-
putational modelling study to date accounts for the mechanis-
tic basis of the slow emotional Stroop effect. Wyble et al.
(2008) expand on the earlier conflict resolution account by
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Botvinick and colleagues (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, &
Cohen, 2001; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). They sug-
gest that automatic processing of negative emotional words
results in decreased deployment of attentional/cognitive con-
trol necessary for the ongoing task. This should release re-
sources for preparing to locate and process a potential threat
and lead to a delay in colour naming after negative words,
corresponding to the slow emotional Stroop effect. As in the
previous modelling studies, the authors suggest that the cog-
nitive control node might correspond to the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC). The authors further suggest that
the rACC could be recruited when processing negative or
threatening material, with a specific role to inhibit the dACC
and reduce task-related attention. The model is consistent with
evidence of involvement of the rACC in generating the emo-
tional Stroop effect (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; Whalen
et al., 1998). It also accounts well for the slow emotional Stroop
effect (Algom et al., 2004; McKenna & Sharma, 2004). The
neurobiological interpretation of the model, however, remains
controversial. Mohanty et al. (2007), for example, reported
correlating activations in the rACC and the dACC during
performance at the emotional Stroop task, which contradicts
the competition hypothesis. Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, and
Hirsch (2006) and Egner, Etkin, Gale, and Hirsch (2008) re-
ported an inhibitory effect of the rACC activation over the
subsequent amygdala activity, in a face–word version of the
task. This suggests that the rACC is involved in diminishing
bottom-up propagation of emotional information—a theory
opposite to Wyble et al. (2008).
Depressive classical and emotional Stroop effects
Depression is a prevalent psychiatric disorder characterized by
a range of affective and cognitive symptoms, including per-
sistent sad mood or depressive ruminative thought, dimin-
ished ability to concentrate, and diminished ability to make
decisions (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). A recent
meta-analysis has indicated a robust effect of depression on
performance in the classical and the emotional Stroop tasks
(Epp et al., 2012). The authors reviewed 47 studies and re-
ported that depression is robustly associated with higher col-
our-naming response times in all except congruent conditions,
with negatively valenced words being associated with the
strongest effect compared to neutral and positive words.
Significantly stronger interference (depression compared to
controls) was also found in the incongruent condition of the
classical Stroop task. Results are consistent with a previous
meta-analysis of attentional bias in depression (Peckham,
McHugh, & Otto, 2010). Most notably, Epp and colleagues
have discovered a correlation between depressive symptom
severity (Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression scores) and
depression effect sizes at the negative and incongruent Stroop
task conditions. This suggests that changes in the Stroop
performance in depression, particularly in association with
negatively valenced stimuli, could be relevant to the symp-
tomatology of the disorder.
Few studies have investigated the neural basis of altered
performance at the classical Stroop task in depression. One
fMRI study indicated increased activations in the rACC and
the DLPFC in unmedicated depressed patients (Wagner et al.,
2006). In contrast, decreased activations in many brain re-
gions—including the middle frontal gyrus and the posterior
cortex—were reported at incongruent condition in another
study (Kikuchi et al., 2012). In both cases, however, no be-
havioural differences between depressed and control partici-
pants were observed. When increased response times and er-
ror rates were observed, they were reported to correlate with
decreased activations in small regions of the DLPFC and the
dACC (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008). Overall, these results
indicate that lower activation in the prefrontal regions (includ-
ing the DLPFC)might contribute to slower performance in the
classical Stroop task, while overactivation of these region
might represent compensatory activity.
With regard to the neural correlates of the emotional Stroop
task performance in depression, only a single fMRI study
appears to have been conducted. Results indicate hyperactiv-
ity in the rACC and in the precuneus, with the rACC hyper-
activation positively correlating with the negative-word trial
response latencies (Mitterschiffthaler et al., 2008). The au-
thors did not find stronger activation of the amygdala (report-
ed to be hyperactive in depression; Drevets, 2003; Hamilton
et al., 2012; Whalen, Shin, Somerville, McLean, & Kim, 2002).
Drawing on Etkin et al. (2006), Mitterschiffthaler et al. (2008)
suggested that the rACC could act as a compensatory mecha-
nism—to inhibit lower-level emotional processing in the
amygdala. If this is the case, the hyperactive rACC would
not contribute directly to the behavioural effects of depression
at the emotional Stroop task.
Depression neurobiology
General neurobiology of depression has been the subject of
several important theoretical reviews over the last decades.
Mayberg (1997) proposed an influential depression model
emphasizing increases in ventral limbic area activations
(amygdala, hippocampus, hypothalamus), alongside an activ-
ity decrease in dorsal neocortical (dACC and DLPFC) areas.
These neural alterations arguably correspond to increased neg-
ative conditioned and affective processing (mood symptoms)
and decreased task-related cognitive control (cognitive symp-
toms). DeRubeis, Siegle, & Hollon (2008) have suggested an
imbalance in the interactions between the amygdala and the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) as a hallmark abnormality in depres-
sion (with the amygdala exerting a stronger influence over the
PFC), which is ameliorated with successful treatment. Disner
and colleagues related depressive neural deficits to
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components of Beck’s influential cognitive model and sug-
gested amygdalar hyperactivity as the crucial contributing fac-
tor to negatively biased information processing in attention,
memory, and interpretation (Beck, 1967; Disner, Beevers,
Haigh, & Beck, 2011). The dACC and the DLPFC are, on
the other hand, suggested as hypoactive—exerting reduced
modulating control over the limbic affective processing. In
line with these suggestions, Roiser and Sahakian (2013) have
also proposed a novel cognitive neuropsychological model of
depression, stressing deficient cognitive control from the
DLPFC and increased negative emotional bias in the amyg-
dala, and other limbic areas, as some of the core depressive
neural abnormalities. A general consensus between these the-
oretical reviews is that limbic affective areas—most notably
the amygdala—become metabolically hyperactive in depres-
sion, while dorsal cortical areas responsible for higher cogni-
tion become hypoactive.
A wealth of evidence indicates deficiency in monoamine
neurotransmission in depression, with particular importance
of serotonin (Blier & El Mansari, 2013; Mulinari, 2012).
Evidence from the last 2 decades, however, also indicates an
important role of dopamine in the disorder. Animal models of
depression, for example, have been characterized by reduced
dopaminergic neurotransmission, particularly in the
mesolimbic pathway (Cabib & Puglisi-Allegra, 1996; Gessa,
1996). Pharmacological agents which increase dopamine
levels (bupropion and amineptine) are currently used as a sec-
ond-line treatment for depression with some degree of success
(IsHak et al., 2009; Rampello, Nicoletti, & Nicoletti, 2000;
Shultz & Malone, 2013). Recent reviews highlight that dopa-
mine transmission alterations are highly relevant to the depres-
sive symptomatology (Dunlop & Nemeroff, 2007; Nestler &
Carlezon, 2006; Pizzagalli, 2014). In summary, although se-
rotonin has historically received the most attention in depres-
sion, emerging evidence also indicates deficits in dopaminer-
gic neurotransmission.
In this study, wewill consider involvement of the amygdala
and the dopamine system in the generation of the emotional
Stroop effect. We will return to the relevant neurobiological
deficits overviewed above when we constrain the possible
mechanisms of depression in the Theory and Methods
sections.
Modelling aims
Our first aim is to attempt to better explain the neural mecha-
nisms involved in generating the emotional Stroop effects,
within an integrative model of both the classical and emotion-
al Stroop tasks. Previous account suggests that the slow effect
arises because of reduced deployment of cognitive control
(Wyble et al., 2008). Its neurobiological interpretation—com-
petition between dACC and rACC—remains controversial
(e.g. Etkin et al., 2006; Mohanty et al., 2007). The current
modelling study aims to provide a better biologically ground-
ed explanation of the effect drawing on the novel interpreta-
tion of emotional words as a case of conditioned stimuli. We
suggest that neural mechanisms of conditioned stimuli pro-
cessing could be responsible for generating the slow emotion-
al Stroop effect.
Our second aim is to investigate mechanisms of the in-
creased response times at both the classical and emotional
Stroop tasks in depression. Increases in response times at
incongruent and negative trials correlate with symptom sever-
ity (Epp et al., 2012). Explanation of neural mechanisms of
these deficits can thus indicate core mechanisms of depression
(Maia & Frank, 2011).
Theory and modelling methods
Conditioned task-set competition theory
The current study constructs a novel integrative model of the
classical and emotional Stroop effects, following the princi-
ples outlined in Cohen et al. (1990). We expand the original
model with additional biologically-based components to ac-
count for the emotional Stroop effect, following interpretation
of the emotional words as conditioned stimuli. Briefly, the
novel suggestion is that mechanisms of conditioned informa-
tion appraisal in the brain also generate the emotional Stroop
reaction time effects.
Classical (Pavlovian) conditioning refers to the ability to
learn associations between neutral stimuli and motivationally
salient events—rewards and punishments. The previously
neutral stimuli predicting (associated with) rewards or punish-
ments are referred to as conditioned stimuli (CS), while the
primary rewards or punishments are referred to as uncondi-
tioned stimuli (US). In brief, classical conditioning refers to
the ability to learn to evoke behaviours relevant to the US
(rewards or punishments) upon a mere presentation of the
CS—even when the US is not present. Positive and negative
words at the emotional Stroop task could be considered a type
of CS because of their primary or secondary associations with
motivationally salient concepts or events—rewards or
punishments.
Expression of conditioned behaviours is crucially mediated
by the amygdala. This is supported by the wealth of rodent
studies indicating criticality of the structure for both learning,
long-term storage, and expression of conditioned fear (CS–
US) associations through the neural mechanism of long-term
potentiation (LeDoux, 2003; Maren, 2005; Phelps & LeDoux,
2005). Functional neuroimaging and lesion studies have also
supported the role of the amygdala in the expression of fear in
humans (Phelps, 2006; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005). Drawing on
this existing evidence, in our model the amygdala acts as the
primary detector of conditioned material—affective words. It
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then sends signals to other brain areas to initiate relevant con-
ditioned behaviours.
Alongside the amygdala, a critical role in conditioned be-
haviour expression has been reported for regions in the PFC.
More specifically, the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC,
encompassing the rACC) is considered to be involved in be-
havioural expression of conditioned fear, as well as acquisi-
tion of fear extinction memories (Courtin, Bienvenu,
Einarsson, & Herry, 2013; Marek, Strobel, Bredy, & Sah,
2013; Maroun, 2013). Both the MPFC and the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC, located caudally to the MPFC) have been sug-
gested to evaluate conditioned stimulus signals from the
amygdala in order to select and initiate most appropriate in-
strumental responses (Cardinal, Parkinson, Hall, & Everitt,
2002; Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011). This is consistent with
strong structural interconnections of the regions with the
amygdala (Carmichael & Price, 1995; Ray & Zald, 2012).
Drawing on this evidence, we suggest that amygdala condi-
tioned stimulus signals (initiated by emotional words) are
propagated to the areas in the PFC, where they support repre-
sentations of behaviours (task sets) relevant for the condi-
tioned material (e.g. escape behaviour in response to a threat
word). These conditioned representations are suggested to
draw resources away from the current ongoing behaviours
(task sets).
Complementary evidence also implicates involvement of
the dopamine system in conditioned behaviour expression.
Dopaminergic burst activity in the ventral tegmental area
(VTA) is theorised to represent reward-prediction error signals
in the brain (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, & Hikosaka,
2010; Lammel, Lim, & Malenka, 2014). Symmetric to dopa-
minergic bursts (spikes)—short phasic decreases (dips) in do-
pamine neuron firing may be characteristic of processing pun-
ishments, and conditioned stimuli predictive of punishments
(particularly those which are uncontrollable; see reviews in
Oleson&Cheer, 2013; Volman et al., 2013). Conditioned dips
in firing of the VTA dopamine neurons are likely triggered by
inhibitory signals from the immediately posterior rostromedial
tegmental area (RMTg; reviewed in Bourdy & Barrot, 2012).
The RMTg receives signals from a range of subcortical struc-
tures, including, among others, the extended amygdala. A
recent optogenetic investigation has indicated that signals
from the extended amygdala to the RMTg are sufficient to
initiate aversion-related behaviours (Jennings et al., 2013).
Drawing on this evidence, we suggest that negative words in
the emotional Stroop task are detected as conditioned stimuli
by the amygdala, which triggers dopamine dip signals in the
VTA. Dopamine signals propagate widely in the brain, with
the PFC as a major target. Dopamine levels in the PFC have
been proposed to promote cognitive stability (stability of the
task set), while decreases in dopamine levels should enable
flexible shifts of the cognitive tasks (Cools, 2008). Drawing
on this theory, we suggest that the amygdala-initiated
dopamine dips are propagated to the PFC, where they de-
crease D1 receptor occupancy (Dreyer, Herrik, Berg, &
Hounsgaard, 2010), which subsequently decreases stability
of the current task set. This is suggested to enable better pro-
cessing of the incoming conditioned negative material.
Importantly, dopamine is transmitted to the PFC largely
through volume diffusion, rather than directly to synapses
(Seamans & Yang, 2004; Lapish, Kroener, Durstewitz,
Lavin, & Seamans, 2007). Stable levels of prefrontal dopa-
mine are defined mainly (though not exclusively) by the bal-
ance between dopamine release and uptake. Decreased trans-
mission from the VTA to the PFC (dopamine dips) should
result in a transient dominance of uptake over release, and
thus decreased dopamine occupancy at the receptor sites
(Dreyer et al., 2010). Dopamine uptake in the PFC, however,
has been shown to be relatively slow, with a time course be-
tween one and tens of seconds (Garris & Wightman, 1994;
Seamans & Yang, 2004; Wayment, Schenk, & Sorg, 2001).
This means that although the dips are fast to reach the PFC,
their destabilising effects would be slower and might only
have an effect after a short delay. We suggest that the slow
nature of the dopamine dip effects over the PFC might con-
tribute to a delay between presentation of negatively condi-
tioned stimuli and the following behavioural reaction.
To summarize, in the constructed model, information from
negatively valenced emotional (conditioned) cues is propagat-
ed through affective areas (amygdala and the VTA) to higher
cortical areas (PFC). This propagation induces a shift of the
task set from the one currently imposed towards a different
one that is more relevant to the conditioned stimulus. The
induced competition between the current and the new tasks
results in reduced activation of the enabled task representation
(word reading or colour naming). This leads to slower pro-
cessing of task-relevant stimuli and thus to slower responses,
corresponding to the emotional Stroop effect. Importantly, be-
cause dopamine dips are slow to take effect in the PFC, task-
set competition is only considered enabled between two con-
secutive trials rather than immediately. This leads to the
between-trial slowdowns, as has been reported experimentally
(Phaf & Kan, 2007). Because the conditioned stimulus-
induced competition in the cognitive task set is the principal
idea of the model, we term the model the conditioned task-set
competition (CTC) account of the emotional Stroop effect. A
description of the computational principles used in the study
follows, with a detailed description of the model architecture
and specification of model parameters.
Modelling methods and architecture
Modelling principles
We follow the connectionist principles of Cohen et al. (1990;
and extensions, e.g. Botvinick et al., 2001; Wyble et al.,
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2008). In brief, each unit in the model represents a population
of neurons in the brain, characterised by a level of activation.
The units are interconnected with each other, which roughly
corresponds to (direct or indirect) white matter projections
between neuron populations. Connection strengths from each
unit mediate how much the unit’s output influences activa-
tions of other units.
Each unit’s activation is the running average of its inputs:
ai;t ¼ ai;t−1 1 − τð Þ þ ii;tτ ð1Þ
Here ai,t is activation of unit i at time t; ii,t is the total input
to unit i at time t; and τ is the activation time constant.
Each unit’s activation is modelled to be always close to or
above zero (set to zero in case of a negative value). Each unit’s
complete input is the sum of weighted outputs of all units with
incoming connections, together with the unit activation bias
(external input in a trial):
ii;t ¼
X
j
o j;tw j;i þ bi ð2Þ
Here oj,t - output from unit j at time t; bi - bias / external
input to unit i at current trial; wj,i - connection strength from
unit j to unit i.
Finally, each unit’s output is computed as its sigmoid-
transformed activation:
o j;t ¼ 1
1þ e−γi Sai;t−1 − θð Þ
− d ð3Þ
In Eq. 3, d ¼ 1
1 þ eγiθ is the term used to force unit output to
zero when unit activation is zero; and γi, θ, S - unit i output
function parameters (γi is different between the processing,
conditioned, and task-set layers).
During the course of a trial, unit activations are repeatedly
updated until one of the units in the response layer achieves a
prespecified threshold. The response is then considered to be
achieved. This is a simplification from the original response
mechanism of Cohen et al. (1990), which was based on evi-
dence accumulation. Similarly simpler response mechanisms
have been used successfully in other models (e.g. Wyble et al.,
2008; Yeung et al. 2004). The number of update cycles of the
unit activations is taken as representative of the trial response
time. To relate the number of update cycles (RTcycles) to a
response time in milliseconds (RTms), the cycle numbers are
translated in the following way:
RTms ¼ RTcycles*K þ I ð4Þ
Here, K is the regression parameter (how many cycles cor-
respond to a millisecond?) and I is the intercept parameter
(how much time does it take for stimulus preprocessing and
for response execution outside of the model?).
Response errors and variability in response times between
trials have not been considered. Hence, performance of the
constructed model is deterministic—no unit activation noise
is included. This was also the case in the previous modelling
account (Wyble et al., 2008).
Critically, the γ parameters above are representative of the
gains of the unit output functions, such that higher γ param-
eter values result in sharper unit outputs. A higher γ value
results in a sharp increase in the output when unit activation
reaches a certain threshold. Lower values of the γ parameter
result in a more linear relationship between the activation and
output, with lower maximal output of the unit. An illustration
of the effect of the γ parameter over the unit output function
can be found in Appendix 1. A prominent neurobiological
interpretation of the gain (γ) parameter for PFC has been
proposed by Servan-Schreiber, Printz, and Cohen (1990), sug-
gesting relevance to the levels of catecholamines (in particu-
lar, dopamine) effective over the activated units. This interpre-
tation has been expanded upon and applied to explain dopa-
minergic deficiency aspects of schizophrenia in relation to
cognitive deficits in the disorder (Cohen & Servan-
Schreiber, 1993; Servan-Schreiber, Bruno, Carter, & Cohen,
1998; see also Braver, Barch, & Cohen, 1999). Recent neuro-
physiological evidence supports this interpretation of the do-
pamine effects over prefrontal neurons, specifically through
D1 receptors (Thurley, Senn, & Lüscher, 2008). Drawing on
these theoretical considerations, the γT (gain) parameter of the
task set (PFC) units has been taken as representative of the
levels of dopamine in the PFC in effect at D1 receptors in the
current study.
Dopamine level in the PFC (gain of the task-set units,γT) is
computed basing on the output levels of dopamine midbrain
cells (VTA, represented by the reinforcement unit PR in the
model):
γT ¼ γTmin þ rToR ð5Þ
Here, γTmin represents the minimal output gain of the PFC
units when no dopaminergic input is present, rT is a dopamine-
level scale parameter, and oR is the output of the reinforcement
unit (PR) at the end of the preceding trial. To simulate the slow
time course of dopamine effects over the PFC, γT is only
updated between every two consecutive trials and fixed during
the course of a single trial.
Model architecture
The constructed model consists primarily of the two compet-
ing pathways for processing colours and words from
preprocessed perceptual to response selection stages—as in
the other models of the classical Stroop effect. The word-read-
ing pathway (see Fig. 1, IPw and PRw connections) is stronger
than the colour-naming pathway (see Fig. 1, IPc and PRc
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connections). The processing priority is imposed by the task-
set activation (Tc or Tw unit), which supports activations in
either the word reading, or in the colour naming pathway, to
enable successful completion of the current task. Units within
the classification, response and task-set layers have inhibitory
connections between each other.
The classical Stroop effect is explained by a combination of
mechanisms proposed in the model by Cohen et al. (1990) and
its further extension (Herd et al., 2006). Colour-neutral and
colour-incongruent words induce strong interference when the
network identifies the colour, due to the stronger word-
processing pathway connections. This results in slower re-
sponses at both neutral and incongruent conditions, compared
to congruent. During incongruent trials, the colour-naming
task unit further facilitates all colour-word units (through
TcPw connection). This increases response competition com-
pared to neutral trials and results in the highest slowdown at
the incongruent condition—corresponding to the Stroop ef-
fect. This mechanism is similar to the account of Herd et al.
(2006), where the colour-concept unit plays the role similar to
the TcPw connection in the current model. Overall, the input,
processing, response and task-set layers, and connections be-
tween them (see Fig. 1) are responsible for the classical Stroop
effect, similar to the previous accounts (Cohen et al., 1990;
Herd et al., 2006).
The third pathway is representative of processing condi-
tioned stimuli. The pathway consists of two components: (1)
Dopaminergic control of the task-set unit outputs (IWn – PEn
– PR – Tc / Tw / Tn pathway) and (2) Conditioned information
propagation to the task set in the PFC (IWn – PEn – Tn path-
way). The PEn conditioned processing unit in the pathways is
suggested to correspond to the amygdala. This unit in the
model is only activated when processing negative words
(IWn input unit active), but completely inactive otherwise
for healthy controls. When activated, the unit exerts inhibitory
control over the VTA-representative reinforcement unit PR,
through connection Per. Inhibition of the PR unit is suggested
to correspond to dopaminergic decrease signals (likely medi-
ated by the intermediary RMTg structure). These dopamine
signals propagate to the PFC (Tc, Tw, Tn units, connection Rt)
and reduce output levels of those task-set units which are
highly active—in order to facilitate competition (see Eq. 5
and Appendix 1). The negative task/concept representation in
the PFC—Tn unit—then receives direct support from the PEn
unit through connection PTe. This initiates competition be-
tween the task-set representations—Tc and Tw units against
the Tn unit. The two mechanisms—dopamine level decrease
and competition between tasks—contribute to decreased in-
fluence of the current task set over behaviour, and thus slower
responses when negative emotional cues are present. Overall,
Fig. 1 Conditioned task-set competition model architecture. Arrows
represent excitatory connections. Circled arrows represent inhibitory
connections. Solid lines represent model connections. Dashed lines
represent model inputs and outputs. Depressive mechanism (highlighted
in bold): Increased tonic input to the conditioned processing unit
(amygdala), and increased strength of inhibitory connection from the
conditioned processing unit to the reinforcement prediction unit.
Abbreviations: PFC = prefrontal cortex; VTA = ventral tegmental area;
DA = dopamine
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the conditioned processing (IWn – PEn – Tn) and the rein-
forcement (IWn – PEn – PR – Tc / Tw / Tn) pathways are
responsible for the emotional Stroop effect.
It should be noted that during the course of a single
negative-word trial, dopamine in the PFC (γT) stays at the
same relatively high level due to the slow course of dopamine
reuptake. Although the Tn negative concept unit receives con-
ditioned information signals from the amygdala (PEn unit), it
cannot become activated because of the high output of the
active task set (Tc or Tw unit; see Appendix 1), and strong
lateral inhibition. The same principle of high neural-gain me-
diated inhibition has been shown to focus information pro-
cessing on highly representative or important features, and
to limit learning (Eldar, Cohen, & Niv, 2013). Between two
sequential trials, dopamine dip takes effect in the PFC, reduc-
ing the γT neural gain. Activations of units in the task set (Tc,
Tw and Tn), as well as the conditioned pathway units (PEn and
PR), are carried over from the previous trial, mimicking a form
of rudimentary working memory. Because of the lower neural
gain, Tn unit is then able to become activated and to compete
with the other task-set units. Both the reduced neural gain (γT)
and the activated competing negative concept (Tn unit) de-
crease outputs of the highly active task-set units—Tc and Tw.
This results in a delayed response in the trial following the
negative-word presentation, accounting for the slow
between-trial nature of the emotional Stroop effect.
Model constraints and specification
Performance constraints for the model were as follows. The
model crucially had to produce correct responses at both
colour-naming and word-reading tasks with colour (congruent
and incongruent), neutral, and negative emotional words. For
the classical Stroop task, the model was aimed to reproduce
response times from the hallmark study of Dunbar and
MacLeod (1984), Experiment 2, as in the previous connec-
tionist accounts (Cohen et al., 1990; Herd et al., 2006; Wyble
et al., 2008). For the emotional Stroop task, performance con-
straints were taken from McKenna and Sharma (2004),
Experiment 3, and Algom et al. (2004), Experiment 2. In
McKenna and Sharma (2004), a single negative word initiated
a between-trial effect when presented in sequence with neutral
words. Algom et al. (2004) have shown that the emotional
slowdown predominantly occurs in blocks of trials, at both
colour-naming and word-reading tasks. We selected these
three datasets because they are highly representative of the
classical and emotional Stroop reaction-time slowdowns.
Accounting for these signatures enables a further investigation
of deficits responsible for the effects of depression on reaction
times. We describe below how the model parameters were
specified and outline how the selected datasets were applied
to constrain parameter values.
The constructed model has nine activation parame-
ters—four input biases, one unit time constant, three
output gain parameters, and one response threshold.
These parameters were all fixed to either biologically
or functionally reasonable values prior to the simula-
tions, and are described in Appendix 1.
Apart from the activation parameters, the model contains
12 connection parameters (see Table 2 in Appendix 1). Three
are responsible for the main processing pathway connections
(IPc, PRc, TS), another four are responsible for task-set facil-
itation of the processing and response units (TcP, TcPw, TwP,
TwR), one responsible for lateral inhibition between layer
units (Li), and another four for task-set reinforcement and
negative conditioned stimulus processing (IPe, PTe, Per, rT).
We describe specification of these parameters below.
First of all, the rT connection represents dopaminergic fi-
bers from the VTA to the PFC and was specified to enable a
high neural gain of the task-set units when the reinforcement
unit is highly active (with rT = 8 and the fixed activation
parameters, γT is close to the value of 8; see Eq. 5, Fig. 9 in
Appendix 1). This represents relatively strong dopaminergic
innervation of the PFC when performing a task. The lateral
inhibitory connection strength (Li) was set to a relatively high
value of 0.8—this means that once one unit is highly active
within a layer, any competing unit must receive an input
higher than 0.8 in order to produce any output. Together with
a sufficiently high neural gain, this warrants strong lateral
inhibition within layers. The PRc connection strength was tied
to the response threshold (see Appendix 1) and specified to the
value of 0.8. This connection was set to be sufficiently strong
so that the maximal output of a processing unit could warrant
its relevant response unit to cross the threshold and generate a
response. The IPc and TS parameters concluded parametriza-
tion of the processing connections and were specified to suf-
ficiently low values so that the model could not generate a
response (cross the response threshold) without an active
task-set unit (IPc = 0.5 and TS = 1.2; note that the TS param-
eter represents the training scale parameter and has to be
above one; see Table 2 in Appendix 1).
We then explored and specified the four task-to-processing
connections (TcP, TcPw, TwP, TwR) to replicate the classical
Stroop effect. Specifically, the TcP and TcPw connections
were set to replicate highest colour-naming reaction times at
the incongruent condition, followed by neutral condition, and
followed by congruent condition. TwP connection was speci-
fied to be strong enough to replicate approximately equal re-
action times between the three conditions at the word-reading
task. Strong TwP connection on its own could not account for
the fast reaction times at the word-reading task. We hence
added a connection from the word-reading task (Tw) unit to
the response units (Rr, Rg, Ro, connection TwR). This is in line
with the notion that the word-reading task is highly practiced
and potentiates response activations when active. These four
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task-set connection strengths were thenmanually tuned to best
replicate 12 performance constraints: six reaction times (three
for colour-naming and three for word-reading), and six related
response correctness measures from Dunbar and MacLeod
(1984, Experiment 2).
We finally specified the three remaining conditioned path-
way connections (IPe, PTe, Per). IPe and PTe connection
strengths were set to the value tied to the input bias of the
task-set units (IPe = PTe = 1, since Tb is fixed to 1; see
Appendix 1). This means that when a conditioned input is
present (IWn unit active), its signal is propagated to the nega-
tive concept (Tn) unit in the task set, with the strength that
matches input of the active task unit. This is considered to
represent strong conditioned-stimulus neural signals from
the amygdala to the PFC, which should enable lateral compe-
tition. Without the Per connection, however, conditioned sig-
nals are propagated to the PFC but cannot activate the Tn
negative concept unit due to lateral inhibition. The Per con-
nection strength was finally specified to replicate the
emotional Stroop effects. Specifically, it was selected to best
replicate three slowdown effects with negative words: the
between-trial slowdown, when a single negative word is pre-
sented in a sequence with neutral words (McKenna & Sharma
2004, Experiment 3), and the two slowdown effects when
negative words are presented in trial blocks at colour-
naming and at word-reading tasks (Algom et al., 2004,
Experiment 2). Additional constraint came from the fact that
the model had to produce correct responses with negative
words, despite the task-set destabilisation.
Overall, 17 behavioural performance data points were ap-
plied—six reaction times and six response correctness mea-
sures at the classical Stroop task (Dunbar & MacLeod, 1984,
Experiment 2), three negative-word slowdown effects
(McKenna & Sharma 2004, Experiment 3; Algom et al.,
2004, Experiment 2), and another two response correctness
measures—when negative words are presented in blocks at
colour-naming and at word-reading tasks. (The resulting set
of connection parameter values can be found in Table 3 in
Appendix 1.)
Depression modelling
The second main aim of this study was to investigate the
mechanisms of the increased response times and the emotion-
al Stroop effect in depression. To this end, following the prin-
ciples of computational psychiatric modelling (Maia & Frank,
2011), we have investigated alterations in the constrained
model. Two main criteria have been applied to identify plau-
sible depression mechanisms. First, the alterations had to re-
produce the reported behavioural deficits—increased re-
sponse times in negative, incongruent, and neutral trials
(Epp et al., 2012). Second, the alterations were constrained
to be relevant to the most prominent reported neural
abnormalities in depression. A more detailed discussion of
the second constraint is as follows.
First, significant neuroimaging evidence indicates alter-
ations in the amygdala as one of the key features of depressive
disorder (e.g. Drevets, 2003; Whalen et al., 2002). A recent
meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies strongly supported
amygdala hyperactivation in response to negative affective
stimuli (Hamilton et al., 2012). Higher depressive amygdala
activity has also been observed specifically in response to
conditioned cues predicting occurrence of aversive pictures
(Abler, Erk, Herwig, & Walter, 2007). These results indicate
stronger neural processing of negatively valenced conditioned
information in the amygdala in depressive disorder.
The amygdala deficit in depression is in line with the prom-
inent theoretical reviews, as we have reviewed in the
Background section. To summarize, Mayberg (1997),
DeRubeis et al. (2008), Disner et al. (2011), and Roiser and
Sahakian (2013), in complementing reviews, have suggested
that limbic brain areas, including the amygdala, are hyperac-
tive in depression. Higher cortical areas, including the
DLPFC, are, on the other hand, hypoactive.
With regard to dopaminergic neurotransmission, as we
have overviewed previously, several reviews have suggested
deficits mainly in the mesolimbic dopamine pathway (Dunlop
& Nemeroff, 2007; Nestler & Carlezon, 2006; Pizzagalli,
2014).We consider dopamine transmission a contributory fac-
tor for generating the emotional Stroop effect in the current
model, and hence suggest that dopamine deficits might be
relevant for the effects of depression at the task.
Drawing on the evidence overviewed above, we hypothe-
sized that a combination of parameter changes in the condi-
tioned processing (amygdala), reinforcement prediction (do-
pamine release) and task-set (PFC) units and connections
could account for the pattern of depressive performance at
the Stroop tasks. Appendix 2 outlines the set of parameters
investigated to reproduce the depressively abnormal Stroop
performance. Our aim has been to identify the simplest com-
bination of parameter changes which closely replicates the
pattern of behavioural deficits, and is most consistent with
the neural mechanisms of depressive illness. We have hence
given priority to the combinations which involved the lowest
number of parameters and included at least one of the param-
eters governing the PEn conditioned processing unit activa-
tion. This constraint was aimed to mimic the well-supported
hyperactivity of the amygdala.
Modelling results
Classical Stroop effect account
Similar to the previous connectionist accounts, the parame-
trized model accounts relatively well for the classical Stroop
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effect (Cohen et al., 1990; Herd et al., 2006). Figure 2 shows
performance of the model compared to the experimental
Stroop effect. A possible limitation is in the quantitative match
of colour-naming response time in the congruent condition—
the model predicts a shorter response time than reported ex-
perimentally. This limitation, however, is also characteristic of
the previous models (Cohen et al., 1990; Herd et al., 2006;
Wyble et al., 2008). To additionally confirm the functional
significance of the task-set units, the model was run with these
units disabled (input bias set to zero)—this resulted in incor-
rect model performance with no response generated at neutral
and incongruent trials at either of the tasks.
To check if the model is able to account for the classical
Stroop neuroimaging results of Banich et al., (2000, 2001),
average colour and colour-word processing unit activations
across all trial cycles in each condition during the colour-
naming task were computed. The results are illustrated in
Fig. 3 and show that the pattern of neuroactivations predicted
by the model qualitatively matches the neuroimaging reports.
Higher activation can be observed in the word-processing lay-
er (verbal cortical area) in incongruent, compared to congruent
and neutral trials. This is in line with the model of Herd et al.
(2006, Fig. 3). The model can be considered a simplification
of the TEB account by Herd and colleagues. In particular, the
general concept of colour from the TEB account is replaced by
the connection from the colour-naming task-set unit to the two
colour-word units in the word-processing layer (Fig. 1, con-
nection TcPw). This is consistent with the notion that the gen-
eral concept of colour, as suggested by Herd et al., is recruited
as part of the colour-naming task set in the constructed model.
To additionally confirm utility of the TcPw connection, the
model was simulated with this connection disabled. The mod-
el still produced correct responses, but no longer reproduced
the classical Stroop effect—response times at incongruent and
neutral conditions appeared similar. The neuroactivations ef-
fect illustrated in Fig. 3 could no longer be reproduced—av-
erage activations of the word-processing units appeared sim-
ilar in the neutral and incongruent conditions. These results
support the theory of Herd et al. (2006), which suggests that
task-related information processing is facilitated in all dimen-
sions, including those which may not be relevant for the task
(i.e. colour-related information in verbal areas).
Emotional Stroop effect account
The specified model can account for the experimentally re-
ported slow emotional Stroop effect, occurring at both colour-
naming and word-reading tasks.
To replicate the carry-over slow emotional Stroop effect,
we simulated the model in accordance with the experimental
conditions of McKenna and Sharma (2004). An array of con-
secutive colour-naming trials was executed, where the first
trial word was negative, while the following trial words were
neutral. Results of the sequence simulation may be seen in
Fig. 4. Experimental response times were extracted and
replotted from McKenna and Sharma (2004, Experiment 3,
Fig. 1). As can be noted from Fig. 4, the model accounts
relatively well for the between-trial slowdown effect of a sin-
gle negative word presentation. The modelled colour-naming
response time at the trial immediately following the negative-
Fig. 2 Classical Stroop interference effect, as reported in Dunbar and MacLeod (1984, Experiment 2, Fig. 3) (a), and modelled replication (b).
Experimental response times and standard errors extracted and replotted. Model regression and intercept parameters: K = 1.82 ms/cycle, I = 398 ms
Fig. 3 Modelled classical Stroop colour-naming task neuroactivations in
word- and colour-processing units
Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci
word trial (first in the sequence) is significantly slower than at
the trials from the sequence with no negative words (Fig. 4b,
Trial 2, 975 ms vs. 920 ms).
Algom et al. (2004) showed that when negative and neutral
word trials are presented in blocks, the emotion-related re-
sponse delay effect extends not only to the colour-naming task
but also to the word-reading task. Depending on the experi-
mental conditions, the delay observed for blocked negative
words at word reading appeared just as high as at colour nam-
ing. To replicate these results, the model was simulated at
colour naming and word reading with the trials presented in
blocks. The resulting mean simulated response times com-
pared to the original experimentally reported data are present-
ed in Fig. 5. The specified model accounts well for the effect
of negative words at colour naming in blocks of trials. For
word reading, the model accounts for the significant slow-
down with negative words, but the predicted effect is slightly
lower than experimentally reported (Fig. 5, word-reading task,
approx. 25 ms modelled vs. approx. 35 ms experimental). The
model thus replicates the blocked emotional Stroop effect, but
predicts a higher magnitude of the effect at the colour-naming
task compared to word reading. This is in a slight contrast to
the results reported by Algom et al. (2004), which indicate
comparable effects in both tasks.
To summarize, the model accounts well for the emo-
tional Stroop effect both in sequence of mixed words
(Fig. 4; McKenna & Sharma, 2004), and when negative
words are presented in blocks (Fig. 5; Algom et al.,
2004). The model thus captures both the emotional
reaction-time slowdown and its predominantly slow
between-trial nature (Phaf & Kan, 2007).
Depression modelling results
Alteration in no single model parameter, from those selected
as relevant for depression (Appendix 2), could account for the
entire pattern of depressive deficits. During further explora-
tion, we assumed that an alteration in at least one of the three
Fig. 4 Slow emotional Stroop (sequence) effect, as reported inMcKenna
and Sharma (2004, Experiment 3, Fig. 1) (a), and modelled replication
(b). Experimental response times extracted and replotted. Only second
trial difference between negative-word sequence and neutral-word
sequence response times is significant in both the experimental data
and the modelled replication. Regression and intercept parameters:
K = 3.06 ms/cycle, I = 483 ms
Fig. 5 Blocked emotional Stroop effect, as reported in Algom et al.
(2004, Experiment 2, Fig. 2) (a), and modelled replication
(b). Experimental response times and standard errors were extracted
and replotted. Triple stars indicate highly significant difference
(p < .001). Colour-naming was reported significantly slower compared
to word-reading (not shown in figure). All differences between model
performance statistics are significant (no variability was modelled).
Regression and intercept parameters: K = 1.15 ms/cycle, I = 476 ms
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parameters governing activation of the conditioned processing
unit (IPe, conditioned unit input connection strength; Eb, con-
ditioned unit input bias; or the conditioned unit output gain)
must be present in depression. Increase in either of these pa-
rameters could be considered representative of hyperactivity
of the amygdala.
Touples of parameter alterations were explored with the
above constraint. Results revealed one simple plausible com-
bination involving alteration of two parameters: increased ton-
ic activity in the conditioned processing unit (Eb increase from
zero to a moderate value), and increase in inhibitory connec-
tion strength between the conditioned processing unit and the
reinforcement unit (Per connection strength increase). This
corresponds to moderate baseline hyperactivity of the amyg-
dala and stronger inhibition of mesocortical dopamine release
in depression. Specific details of the depressive parameter
alterations can be found in Appendix 2. An illustration of
the identified depression mechanism is highlighted in bold
in Fig. 1.
The identified depressive mechanism (Eb input increase;
Per connection strength increase) could generally replicate
the slowdowns at the Stroop tasks. Highest slowdown is ob-
served at the negative condition, followed by the incongruent
condition, and then neutral condition (see Fig. 6). This is in
line with the meta-analytic results by Epp et al. (2012). Epp
and colleagues reported a highly significant Hedges’ g value
of 0.98 for the effect of depression in the negative-word
Stroop condition (basing on 19 studies), followed by 0.86
for incongruent condition (basing on 14 studies), and 0.81
for neutral condition (basing on 17 studies). Hedges’ g is a
standardized effect size measure computed by normalizing the
difference between sample means with a corrected measure of
the pooled standard deviation (Durlak, 2009). For qualitative
comparison of effect sizes between conditions, the simple
absolute mean difference between participant samples (depres-
sion and control) could be considered equivalent to theHedges’ g
(or other standardized effect sizes)—drawing on an assumption
that the pooled standard deviations are very close or similar be-
tween all conditions. This could be considered a generally rea-
sonable assumption for experimental conditions of the Stroop
and emotional Stroop tasks. In terms of condition mean differ-
ences between samples, the modelled depression mechanism
generated the following simulated effects (in cycles): 108 in
negative-word condition; 84 in incongruent condition; followed
by 51 in neutral condition, and 21 in congruent condition. These
results are qualitatively in line with the meta-analytic report by
Epp et al. (2012), but also predict a small effect at the congruent
condition.
Figure 7 illustrates how the model performance compares
against the experimental data for the classical Stroop task in
depression. Holmes and Pizzagalli (2008) have reported that
depression was associated with significantly slower response
times at the incongruent, compared to the congruent condi-
tion. The depression model can replicate these results. The
quantitative aspect of this fit, however, should not be taken
too strongly. The authors only report behavioural results for
two experimental Stroop conditions in their study: congruent
and incongruent. With only two metrics and two parameters
inferred for translating simulated response times from model
cycles to milliseconds (regression coefficient and intercept;
Eq. 4), there is a risk of overfitting the regression model.
These results should be taken as an illustration of a qualitative
fit of the model to the depressive performance at the classical
Stroop task as well as an illustration of the potential of the
model to quantitatively fit depression behavioural data.
With regard to the emotional Stroop task, the model per-
formance was compared to the behavioural results reported by
Mitterschiffthaler et al. (2008). Mitterschiffthaler and col-
leagues have not reported a significant difference between
depression and control performance at the neutral-word con-
dition, despite a trend towards slower responses. Depressed
participants in the study have shown significantly slower re-
sponses to negative words, compared to controls. Figure 8
illustrates performance of the model compared to these results.
The model qualitatively replicates the response time increase
in the negative-word condition in depression. As previously,
these results should not be taken as a strong claim of a good
quantitative fit to the depressive behavioural data, due to only
two reported control experimental conditions (negative word
and neutral word) modelled to derive the regression parame-
ters. Compared to the results by Mitterschiffthaler and col-
leagues, the model predicts a significant depressive slowdown
at the neutral condition—in line with the meta-analysis results
(Epp et al., 2012).
To check how each of the two depressive alterations con-
tributes to the behavioural effects, we simulated them sepa-
rately. Results revealed that both deficits (hyperactive
Fig. 6 Depression mechanism simulation results. Introduction of the
depressive mechanism leads to—in the order of absolute effect size—
slower responses in the negative condition, followed by incongruent
condition, followed by neutral and, finally, congruent conditions
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amygdala and increased inhibitory influence of the amygdala
over the VTA) are responsible for the increase in response
times at the neutral and incongruent conditions. Output gen-
erated by the tonically hyperactive PEn unit (amygdala) prop-
agates to the task set and results in weaker influence of the Tc
colour-naming task unit over task-related processing (PCr and
PCg), resulting in response delays. This is, however, only
possible when the Per connection strength is increased (DA
release from the VTA is sufficiently inhibited), whichwarrants
decreased task-set output gains and enables the amygdalar
signal to propagate. Only the increased Per connection
strength, on the other hand, appeared responsible for the
higher response times at the negative-word colour-naming
trials, with little effect from the tonically hyperactive PEn unit.
The strongerPer connection decreases DA release specifically
when negative words are present, and thus increases influence
of negative words over the task-set stability.
Exploration of the parameter space revealed that sev-
eral other simple deficit combinations could also repli-
cate the depressive behavioural effects. Specifically, hy-
peractive amygdala and either the decreased reinforce-
ment unit output gain, the decreased reinforcement unit
input bias, or the decreased dopaminergic connection
from reinforcement to task set, could also replicate the
effects. These alternative mechanisms, however, all ap-
peared less biologically relevant to depression than the
main identified combination. Details of the alternative
mechanisms are described in Appendix 2. We briefly
overview them and highlight evidence favouring the
main identified combination in the Discussion section.
Fig. 7 Classical Stroop effect in depression, as reported in Holmes and
Pizzagalli (2008, Table 1a) (a), andmodelled replication (b).Double stars
indicate high significance (p < .01), triple stars indicate highest
significance (p < .001). All modelled condition response time differences
are significant (no variability has been modelled). Regression and
intercept parameters: K = 0.35 ms/cycle, I = 439 ms
Fig. 8 Blocked emotional Stroop effect in depression, as reported in
Mitterschiffthaler et al. (2008) (a), and modelled replication (b).
Experimental response times and standard errors extracted and replotted.
Double stars indicate high significance (p < .01), triple stars indicate
highest significance (p < .001). All modelled condition response time
differences are significant (no variability has been modelled).
Regression and intercept parameters: K = 1.31 ms/cycle, I = 383 ms
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Discussion of results
Modelled mechanisms of the emotional Stroop effect
Neurobiological correlates
The constructed model is largely neurobiologically driven and
is consistent with the existing neuroimaging evidence indicat-
ing activation of the amygdala at the emotional Stroop task
(Isenberg et al., 1999), as well as evidence of the amygdala
activation in response to negative emotional words (e.g.
Hamann & Mao, 2002; Naccache et al., 2005; Straube et al.,
2011).
Whalen et al. (1998) and Mohanty et al. (2007) reported
activation of the rACC at the emotional Stroop trials. Our
model does not explicitly account for the rACC activation;
however, two interpretations can be given. Namely, the
rACC could either be involved directly in generation of the
emotional Stroop effect, or recruited as a compensatory mech-
anism to maintain correct performance in the face of affective
distraction (as suggested e.g. in Mohanty et al., 2007). In the
first case, the rACC could in part be represented by the Tn
negative-concept unit in our model—providing competition
with the task representation (Tc unit) in the DLPFC, and gen-
erating the slow effect. The second case—suggestion of a
compensatory role of the rACC—is consistent with the evi-
dence of involvement of the rACC in resolving emotional
conflict and inhibiting the amygdala (e.g. Egner et al., 2008;
Etkin et al., 2006). In the second case, the rACC would not
contribute directly to generating the emotional Stroop effect
and could hence be left safely outside of the scope of our
model.
We suggest that propagation of conditioned information to
higher cortical areas results in competition between represen-
tations of the current task set and the concepts related to
conditioned information. We do not specify where exactly in
the PFC this competition might take place; however, some
existing theories provide an indication. Badre (2008) has pro-
posed that the PFC is organized in a rostro-caudal hierarchy—
with more anterior regions containing progressively more ab-
stract representations of contexts and goals. In our model,
conditioned information competition could occur in the more
rostral, abstract concept-related areas of the PFC, with subse-
quent destabilizing effects over the more caudal prefrontal
areas, including the DLPFC, which hold specific behavioural
task-set representations. OFC has been suggested to extract
and store valuation associated with conditioned information
(e.g. Holland & Gallagher, 2004; Frank & Claus, 2006).
MPFC has been suggested to have a role in selection of ap-
propriate actions (e.g. Frank, Cohen, & Sanfey, 2009).
Drawing on the reported connectivity of the amygdala
(Carmichael & Price, 1995; Ray & Zald, 2012), it is possible
that conditioned information is primarily propagated to the
OFC and the MPFC, where it triggers conflict between
higher-level context representations. Effects of this conflict
may then propagate to more caudal task-related areas, which
results in task deactivation and behavioural slowdowns.
Computational modelling accounts
The earliest connectionist account of the emotional Stroop
effect has been proposed by Matthews and Harley (1996).
The authors suggested that the slowdown effect arises because
of excitatory facilitation of affective information processing,
which results in the task-related response interference—simi-
lar to the classical Stroop effect. The early model byMatthews
and Harley does not account for the predominantly slow in-
tertrial nature of the emotional Stroop effect (McKenna &
Sharma, 2004; Phaf & Kan, 2007). No interpretation is con-
sidered by the authors as to how the excitatory facilitation of
the emotional and threat-related information might be imple-
mented in the brain. This is in contrast to our model, which
explains the slow effect and is neurobiologically driven.
From the perspective of motivational significance of the
slow emotional Stroop effect, our model is conceptually con-
sistent with the previous account by Wyble et al. (2008).
Wyble et al. suggest that the slow effect occurs because of
deallocation of cognitive resources away from the current
colour-naming task in order to deal with the negative-word
signalled threat. Our model supports this notion; however
we suggest that cognitive task-set resources are more specifi-
cally reallocated towards processing negative material, rather
than simply freed from all tasks (decreased cognitive control)
as suggested by Wyble and colleagues.
The distinct advantage of our model over the previous ac-
counts is that we specifically consider the neural mechanisms
of conditioned stimuli processing in generating the emotional
Stroop effect. Wyble and colleagues suggest a neurobiological
interpretation which implicates competition between the
rACC (emotional monitoring) and the dACC (cognitive con-
trol) in generation of the slow effect. The authors note that this
is disputable since little direct evidence of such competition
has been reported. In contrast, we suggest that the slow effect
is generated due to propagation of negative conditioned infor-
mation from limbic (amygdala) to higher cognitive areas
(PFC), which is generally neurobiologically plausible.
Our computational model is constructed with several sim-
plifications which are worth mentioning. First of all, we do not
precisely model phasic (time-limited) dopaminergic dip sig-
nals observed in neurobiology. The model rather presents a
simplified notion of amygdala-induced decrease in dopami-
nergic neurotransmission. Existing investigations show that
phasic dopaminergic neurotransmission is contingent upon
presentation of the CS with the fast-onset dips lasting over a
second (e.g. Mileykovskiy & Morales, 2011; Oleson, Gentry,
Chioma, & Cheer, 2012). Response times in the emotional
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Stroop task are usually below one second. For simplicity, we
have modelled phasic dopamine dips to have an effect over an
entire following trial, and left a more detailed account of these
signals safely outside of the scope of our current model.
In the study, the single set of model parameters was able to
account for both the classical and emotional Stroop effects. It
can be noted, however, that regression and intercept parame-
ters of our model (Eq. 4) vary between the simulated experi-
ments (Figs. 2, 4–5, 7–8). This accounts for cognitive process-
ing differences in different experimental conditions.
Differences in the regression parameter K are representative
of differences in the speed of processing within the connec-
tionist architecture (Fig. 1), while differences in the intercept
parameters I are representative of the different amounts of
time necessary for visual preprocessing and motor mechanics.
Variability in the intercept parameters between conditions is
generally plausible, with values ranging between 380 and
490 ms across the five modelled experiments. Regression
and intercept variability is also characteristic of the previous
account of Wyble et al. (2008). Although we specified each
parameter with sensible constraints, reasonable variations are
highly plausible and would likely correspond to individual
biological or behavioural differences.
Our model serves mainly as a proof of principle that neural
mechanisms of conditioned stimuli processing can account for
the behavioural emotional Stroop effect. We suggest that emo-
tional words serve as negatively conditioned stimuli, and
hence that mechanisms of conditioned stimuli processing
could be responsible for the reaction-time slowdowns.
Because our model is a simplified computational bridge be-
tween the neural mechanisms and behaviour, the model fits
provide proof that, in principle, this is possible. We believe
that these results offer a new perspective on the mechanisms
behind the emotional Stroop effect, which could guide future
investigations with both healthy and clinical participants.
Experimental predictions
Our theoretical account makes several predictions.We consid-
er negative emotional words a case of conditioned stimuli.
This implies that response delays at the emotional Stroop task
could be reproducible when negative words are replaced with
experimentally aversively conditioned stimuli. To test this pre-
diction, experimental participants could first undergo a condi-
tioning procedure—with neutral stimuli paired with aversive
shocks (e.g. as in Raio, Carmel, Carrasco, & Phelps, 2012), or
paired with instrumental responses to avoid shocks. These
same (now conditioned) stimuli could then be used instead
of words at the colour-naming task. We predict that response
delay effects should occur with both aversively conditioned
stimuli and with negative words.
Second, we suggest that the emotional Stroop delay effect
depends crucially on the dopaminergic decrease signals
reaching the PFC. We thus predict that tonically increasing
dopamine levels in the PFC—for example, through adminis-
tration of dopamine degradation inhibitor tolcapone (e.g. as in
Kayser, Allen, Navarro-Cebrian, Mitchell, & Fields, 2012)—
should decrease the impact of the dip signals and counteract
the effect – either decreasing or eliminating occurrence of the
reaction time slowdowns.
Finally, we suggest that the slow emotional Stroop effect is
dependent on propagation of conditioned information to the
prefrontal cortical areas—likely the MPFC and the OFC—to
facilitate reallocation of cognitive resources from the current
task. We thus predict that negative-word time-locked excitato-
ry stimulation of these areas, through application of anodal
transcranial direct current stimulation (TDCS; e.g. Bellaiche
et al., 2013), should enhance representations of conditioned
information and increase the delay effects at the emotional
Stroop trials. Inhibitory cathodal stimulation, should, on the
other hand, impair propagation of conditioned information
and ameliorate the delay effects.
Modelled mechanisms of depressive task-set interference
In the current investigation of mechanisms at play at the
Stroop tasks in depression, we broadly followed the deductive
approach, as termed byMaia and Frank (2011) in their review
of computational psychiatry and neurology modelling
methods. We constructed a connectionist model of normal
performance at the Stroop tasks and specified it to explain
the hallmark behavioural findings (Figs. 2–5). We then inves-
tigated alterations which are most relevant for depressive dis-
order and introduced a simple mechanism which could gener-
ally account for the effects of depression at the tasks (Figs. 6–
8)—hyperactive amygdala and stronger functional inhibitory
influence of the amygdala over the VTA dopamine neurons.
To our knowledge, this is the first explicit mechanistic theo-
retical account of depressive performance at the classical and
emotional Stroop tasks. Given the reported correlation be-
tween the symptom severity and the response time effects in
depression (Epp et al., 2012), these mechanistic deficits could
be highly relevant to the symptoms of the disorder.
Several neuroimaging studies have linked depressive hy-
peractivity of the amygdala to rumination (Cooney, Joormann,
Eugène, Dennis, & Gotlib, 2010; Mandell, Siegle, Shutt,
Feldmiller, & Thase, 2014). In our model of depression, tonic
amygdalar hyperactivity triggers persistent competition for
resources in the PFC between conditioned negative informa-
tion and task representations. This could be interpreted as
representative of ruminative processes in the disorder. The
novelty of our investigation is therefore that we suggest a
mechanistic link between depressive ruminative processes
and executive deficits at the classical Stroop task. Several
previous behavioural studies also support the assertion that
depressive rumination might be linked to executive deficits
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(e.g. Jones, Siegle, Muelly, Haggerty, & Ghinassi, 2010;
Levens, Muhtadie, & Gotlib, 2009; Watkins & Brown, 2002).
When we explored the depression-relevant parameter
space we were able to replicate the depressive reaction-time
effects with other simple combinations that included the
amygdalar hyperactivity (see Appendix 2). Existing experi-
mental evidence, however, favours the main selected mecha-
nism. Increased gain of the reinforcement unit (first alternative
mechanism; see Appendix 2) could be considered representa-
tive of higher responsiveness to rewards in the dopaminergic
system. Existing evidence, however, indicates that reward
encoding is decreased in main dopamine targets including
the OFC and the striatum, while the dopamine transmission
is likely decreased (Pizzagalli, 2014). Significantly decreased
dopaminergic connectivity from the VTA to the PFC (second
alternative mechanism, Appendix 2) would indicate extensive
white-matter tract abnormalities between the two regions; how-
ever, only limited evidence of such deficits in depression has
been reported (see Bracht, Linden, & Keedwell, 2015 for re-
view). Finally, decreased baseline VTA activity during task per-
formance (third alternative) could be a plausible alternative
mechanism mediating dopamine deficits in depression.
Available experimental evidence, however, indicates that de-
creased dopamine transmission is likely mediated by an active
inhibition process rather than internal VTA factors. Tye et al.
(2013), for example, directly optogenetically inhibited midbrain
dopamine neurons, which reproduced depression-related behav-
iours in rats. Tanaka et al. (2012) reported that attenuation of the
VTA dopamine neurons in depression-susceptible mice is likely
mediated by enhanced VTA inhibitory inputs, due to increased
levels of a specific bioactive lipid—prostaglandin E2. Chang and
Grace (2014) have also reported decreased activity of dopamine
neurons in a rat model of depression. Crucially, this deficit was
reversed by pharmacologically attenuating activity of either the
ventral pallidum (VP) or the basolateral amygdala (BLA).
Further, pharmacological activation of the BLA decreased dopa-
mine neuron activity in control rats. Chang and Grace suggested
that depressive behaviour could be mediated by inhibition of the
VTA dopamine neurons by the BLA, mediated by the interme-
diary VP structure. Altogether, these experimental results pro-
vide a compelling argument favouring the main selected depres-
sion mechanism over the three possible alternatives.
Mitterschiffthaler et al. (2008) have reported stronger acti-
vation of the rACC in depression during performance of the
emotional Stroop task. The authors suggested that hyperactive
rACC could represent a compensatory mechanism—sup-
pressing emotional processing in the amygdala. If this is in-
deed the case, we do not explain hyperactivation of the rACC
at the task since we only consider mechanisms which are
directly involved in generating the task interference effects.
Alternatively, the rACC might be involved in propagation of
negative conditioned information towards higher cognitive
processing—in this case, stronger activation of the negative
concept (Tn) unit due to tonic conditioned signals in our mod-
el might in part be representative of the rACC hyperactivity.
In the model we focus on the effects of negative words
because negative and threat words are most widely used in
the emotional Stroop paradigm (Phaf & Kan, 2007). Epp et al.
(2012), however, also reported a significant reaction time
slowdown with positive words in depression (Hedges’ g of
0.87). This effect was higher than with neutral words (Hedges’
g of 0.81), but lower than with negative words (Hedges’ g of
0.98). Although we do not provide an explicit account, we
suggest that this effect could be due to the same neural mech-
anisms. Specifically, positive words could still be processed
by the amygdala (as conditioned stimuli), but would not trig-
ger dopamine dips, which would limit their behavioural effect
in healthy participants. In depression, decreased dopamine
transmission would enable the positive-word signals to prop-
agate to the PFC, which would result in task-set competition
and response delays. Because of a lack of added dopamine dip
signals with positive words, however, these delays would be
lower than with the negative words, but higher than with neu-
tral words, as reported in Epp et al. (2012).
Drawing on the modelled depression mechanism, we make
several experimentally testable predictions. We suggest that
the amygdala exhibits stronger inhibitory functional influence
over the VTA in depression. This is directly testable through
dynamic causal modelling (DCM)—a technique used suc-
cessfully to investigate functional interactions between brain
regions (Etkin et al., 2006; Friston 2009; Friston, Harrison, &
Penny, 2003). Depressed patients should exhibit stronger in-
hibition of the VTA by the amygdala compared to controls—
either at rest, or during task performance in the scanner.
Because of the tonically inhibited dopamine transmission,
the model also predicts that the depressed participants should
exhibit a small fast (same-trial) emotional Stroop effect along-
side the increased slow between-trial response delay, due to
potentiated processing of negative material.
Conclusion and further investigations
We have proposed a novel integrative model of the
mechanisms at play when generating the classical and
emotional Stroop effects. Our theory is based on the
novel interpretation of emotional words as a specific
case of conditioned stimuli. We grounded the model
with aspects of neurobiology involved in conditioned
stimuli processing. We suggest that the slow between-
trial emotional Stroop effect is mediated by dopamine
decrease signals, which reach the PFC and enable the
amygdala-initiated competition for resources. We sug-
gest that depressive deficits in the Stroop tasks might
be caused by the hyperactive amygdala and the in-
creased functional inhibitory influence of the amygdala
over dopaminergic neurotransmission. Because of the
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reported correlation between depression severity and
task performance (Epp et al., 2012), we suggest that
these proposed mechanisms might be highly relevant
for understanding depressive illness. We believe that
these results offer a new perspective on the mechanisms
of the emotional Stroop effect in health and in depres-
sion, which could lead future investigations. We offered
several experimental predictions, testable though behav-
ioural, cortical stimulation, pharmacological and neuro-
imaging methods—future studies will test and prove or
disprove aspects of our theory and the suggested depres-
sion mechanisms.
One particular avenue for both theoretical and experi-
mental future investigations is the role of the rACC at the
emotional Stroop task. Existing neuroimaging studies
have shown activation of the region when performing
the task (Bush et al., 2000; Mohanty et al., 2007;
Whalen et al., 1998), and Mitterschiffthaler et al. (2008)
have reported hyperactivity at negative-word trials in de-
pression. Future studies should better explain the func-
tional role of this region and might indicate whether its
hyperactivation at negative word trials is relevant for
symptomatology of depression.
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Appendix 1 | Model parametrization
Model unit activation parameters are briefly described in
Table 1. Input bias Ib and Tb parameters are constrained
to the value one at the trial-relevant task unit and the
trial-relevant input units. The canonical value of one
follows from the fact that output of a single unit is
constrained between zero and one (see Fig. 9). Eb is
always zero for control (healthy) participant simulations.
All other units do not receive external inputs from out-
side of the model. Time constant of unit activations has
been fixed to the value τ = 0.025 for all units, although
this is not principal for the model performance.
Response threshold has been constrained to RTh = 0.75,
representing a high response unit activation necessary
for response generation. All input, processing and re-
sponse unit output gains were set to γP = 6, which
represents an intermediate gain—resulting in neither
highly thresholded, nor linear input–output neural func-
tion, likely characteristic of average neural populations
in the brain (see Fig. 9). Conditioned and reinforcement
(PEn and PR) unit gains were set to a higher value γC =
8, representing a biologically-viable high responsiveness
o f t he s e un i t s t o cond i t i oned inpu t s i gna l s .
Reinforcement unit input bias was set to Rb = 0.65,
which results in relatively high (but not maximal) output
of the unit during the task. This is considered to repre-
sent relatively high dopaminergic stimulation of the PFC
to maintain the task-set during performance. Minimal
output gain of the task-set units was specified to γTmin
= 0.5. This results in almost linear relationship between
inputs and outputs for task-set units, with small maximal
outputs (e.g. Fig. 9), simulating low PFC activation, and
thus low lateral competition when no dopaminergic stim-
ulation is present.
Output of each unit is driven by its activation (a) and de-
fined by Eq. 3 (see main text):
o j;t ¼ 1
1þ e−γi Sai;t−1 − θð Þ
− d ð3Þ
Table 1 Model unit activation parameters
Parameter Description
Ib Input unit input bias (fixed)
Tb Task-set unit input bias (fixed for control simulations)
Rb Reinforcement prediction unit input bias
Eb Conditioned processing unit input bias (zero for control
simulations)
τ Time constant of all neural units
γP Output gain of all input, processing and response units
γC Output gain of the conditioned processing units (PEn and PR)
γTmin Minimal output gain of the task-set units
RTh Response threshold of the model
Fig. 9 Model unit output function dependency on unit gain (γ) and unit
activation (α)
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In Eq. 3, θ = 1 and S = 2 fixed for all units. This constrains
unit outputs to lie between zero and one and forces unit output
to zero when no unit input is present (see Fig. 9).
Unit output is dependent on the unit gain (γ), which is
representative of dopamine levels for task-set (PFC) units
(Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1993; Servan-Schreiber et al.,
1990; Servan-Schreiber et al., 1998). Figure 9 illustrates effect
of the γ parameter over the unit output function. As can be
noted from Fig. 9, high unit gain results in lower outputs at
low activations (e.g. γ = 8, activation below 0.5), but higher
maximal output (γ = 8, activation above 0.8). Lower gain, on
the other hand, results in higher unit outputs at low activations,
but lower outputs at higher activations, with lower maximal
output (γ = 2). Lower gain thus increases outputs of less active
units and decreases outputs of highly active units. This pro-
motes competition between newly-activated (e.g. Tn) and al-
ready highly active units (e.g. Tc) when they are inhibitorily
interconnected. Negative conditioned stimuli in our model
lead to decreased gain of the task-set (PFC) units—which
we suggest facilitates competition—activation of the
negative-concept (Tn) unit and deactivation of the current
task-set (e.g. Tc) unit.
Model connection parameters are briefly described in
Table 2. Constraints applied to specify the model connec-
tion parameters are described in the main methods section
of the report. The specified model connection parameters
are presented in Table 3.
Appendix 2 | Depression model
Parameters of units and connections responsible for
task-set and conditioned stimulus processing have been
considered as relevant for depression and explored to
identify the most depression-relevant mechanism.
Input biases: Tb, Rb, Eb.
Output gains: τE (output gain of the PEn unit), τR (output
gain of the PR unit).
Connection strengths: IPe, PTe, Per, Rt.
Alteration in no single parameter could account for the
entire pattern of depressive behavioural deficits.
Primary identified simple depression mechanism:
1. Increase in conditioned processing unit input bias Eb
from zero to 0.615 (amygdala hyperactivity).
2. Increase in conditioned processing to reinforcement
prediction connection strength Per from -0.25 to -
0.33 (increase in amygdala inhibitory influence over
dopaminergic transmission).
Alternative identified mechanisms with the amygdalar
hyperactivity resulting in equivalent depressive behav-
ioural deficits:
1. Increase in Eb from zero to 0.63 and increase in
reinforcement prediction unit output gain τR from
8 to 14.5 (stronger VTA responsiveness to input).
2. Increase in Eb from zero to 0.59 and decrease in
connection strength from reinforcement prediction
to task-set Rt from 8 to 2.5 (weak VTA to PFC
connectivity).
3. Increase in Eb from zero to 0.60 and decrease in
reinforcement prediction unit input bias Rb from
0.65 to 0.57 (lower baseline VTA activity).
We consider the primary identified mechanism most
plausible due to its highest relevance to the neurobiolo-
gy of depression. Experimental evidence favouring the
primary identified depression mechanism over the alter-
natives is briefly overviewed in the Discussion section.
Table 3 Specified model connection parameters
Parameter IPc PRc TS IPe PTe Per rT Li TcP TcPw TwP TwR
Value 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.0 1.0 - 0.25 8.0 - 0.8 0.75 0.33 1.1 0.3
Table 2 Model connection parameters
Parameter Description
IPc Colour input to processing connection strength
PRc Colour processing to response connection strength
TS Training scale parameter (IPw = IPc × TS and PRw = PRc × TS)
IPe Negative word input to conditioned processing connection
strength
PTe Conditioned processing to task-set (negative concept) connection
strength
Per Conditioned processing to reinforcement prediction inhibitory
connection strength
rT Reinforcement prediction influence scale
Li Lateral inhibitory connections strength
TcP Colour-naming task to colour-processing connection strength
TcPw Colour-naming task to word-processing (PWr, PWg) connection
strength
TwP Word-reading task to word-processing connection strength
TwR Word-reading task to response connection strength
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